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A creative humane university – coping with the business 
model
In this article it is attempted to indicate that the economistic application of 
economy of scale in the context of a university pushes a university, even 
in its reigning epistemology, ideologically in the direction of technicism, 
scientism, and economism (imposed by neo-pragmatist managerialism). 
Economistic application of economy of scale includes minimising 
academic staff and their support systems, but combined with the 
maximum intake in student numbers. This managerial system introduces 
stereotypical forms of innovation, and inhibits risk-taking, although, 
disciplined playfulness is indeed needed for creative scholarship. It is also 
attempted to analyse creative possibilities in terms of the spectrum of 
possible scholarly problem statements with their proportionate risks. The 
basic forms of abstraction are also outlined in order to give some 
indication of how scholars are to support the development of a 
responsible spirit of renewal of knowledge in their students.  
Opsomming 
’n Kreatiewe, mensgevoelige universiteit – die hantering van 
die besigheidsmodel 
In hierdie artikel word gepoog om aan te toon dat die 
ekonomistiese toepassing van die ekonomiese skaalvoordele 
binne die konteks van ’n universiteit, ook ten opsigte van sy 
dominerende epistemologie, ideologies voortgedryf word in die 
rigting van tegnisisme, sciëntisme en ekonomisme (opgedring 
deur ’n neo-pragmatistiese besturokrasie). Hierdie ekonomis-
tiese toepassing sluit die minimalisering van akademiese 
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personeel en hulle ondersteuningstelsels in, maar gaan ook 
gepaard met die maksimering van studentetalle. Hierdie 
bestuurswyse stel egter stereotiepe vorme van innovering aan 
die orde, en inhibeer die neem van risiko’s, alhoewel ’n 
gedissiplineerde speelsheid nodig is vir kreatiewe vakmanskap. 
’n Analise word ook gebied van die kreatiewe moontlikhede wat 
die spektrum van moontlike wetenskaplike probleemstellings 
bied. Ook die basiese vorme van abstraksie word omlyn om 
sodoende ’n aanduiding te gee van hoe vakwetenskaplikes die 
ontwikkeling van ’n verantwoordelike houding van kennis-
vernuwing in hulle studente kan ondersteun.  
1. A narrative introduction to the issue  
While restructuring our university, management instructed us: “Set 
your programmes and curricula in such a way that best use is made 
of ‘economy of scale’”, which in essence means: Get the maximum 
out of present capacity. 
For this purpose the concepts of research and teaching have been 
separated administratively and in practice, and in each area the 
maximum was required. The following questions can thus rigthly be 
asked: 
• What is the product/output quality of the universitas magistrorum 
atque scholarium under these conditions?  
• Can we turn the tide in a better direction, and how can we do so?  
For the past four to five years I have been teaching a compulsory 
philosophy course for final year students of the B-degree (first 
degree). This course concerns more or less the philosophical 
foundations of the group’s majors and future professions. The 
course was part of the last semester of the third year, and therefore 
of the final part of their degree. For the purposes of this article it 
does not matter which professions and majors are involved. I only 
mention these particulars to indicate what happens with bright young 
people in an educational institution if economy of scale becomes a 
dominant norm of training.  
Proposition 1:  
Scholarly creativity and quality are endangered by “economy of 
scale” type managerialism. 
The following story illustrates this statement: 
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A Monday morning, 08h15, in September 2002.1 My office phone 
rings. A kind female voice greets me – the chair of the Students’ 
Academic Council:  
She: (Somewhat formal tone): Professor, is it correct that your 
philosophy of science students wrote their midterm test Saturday 
morning? (I think: Stupid question – everybody knows that all 3rd 
years of the university had to write that examination the previous 
Saturday.) 
I: Correct.  
She: Professor, is it correct to say that the test counted out of 200?  
I: Yes. I have been quite graceful to them. I asked them to answer 
two questions out of a battery of six, and each answer is graded 
percentage wise.  
She: (Continues the irritating formal tone.) And is it correct, Sir, to 
say that the duration of the test was 90 minutes? (I am trying my 
best to hold my polite pose under cross-examination, not showing 
my growing irritation.)  
I: Yes. It is correct. Something the matter?  
She: (Sounding strict enough for me to imagine a frown): Professor 
(now she accentuates my title), I regret to have to inform you that we 
have received a complaint against you.  
I: Complaint? What kind of complaint?  
She: Professor (she sounds strict again), the students are 
complaining that it is impossible for them to write down 200 facts in 
an hour and a half! 
I: Huh? 
She: And they also want to know where they are supposed to find a 
hundred facts about X or Y? (“X” and “Y” stands for the names of 
paradigm changers in the disciplines involved. For physics it could 
be Newton or Einstein, for Psychology it could be Watson or Freud 
or Jung.)  
                                      
1 A referee of this article called this story “anecdotal”. If the referee meant that it is 
an imaginary narration of what could have happened, then I must insist that it 
really happened, and that I tried to tell it the way it happened.  
Koers 71(2, 3, 4) 2006:357-395  359 
A creative humane university – coping with the business model  
I: Listen ... I shall take up the matter with the students in class. I bet 
that it will be students from discipline P?! Correct? (My turn to ask 
that question – with the right tone of voice. The group of about 70 
consists of two major disciplines connected to two related 
professions. She confirms, a bit surprised by my cleverness!)  
Tuesday morning I meet the class. There is a larger block – group 
“P” consisting of about 55 (the complainants), and a smaller group of 
15 from another profession – lets call them “Q”.  
I: Good morning everybody! Yes, I see you are looking dis-
appointedly at my hands! You will unfortunately not receive your test 
scripts today. There is a little hiccup – some of you have filed a 
complaint against me with the Student’s Academic Council. It goes 
more or less like this: That I expected the impossible of you, having 
to write 200 facts in an hour and a half. And that you cannot deliver 
a hundred facts about any of the questions I asked. (The Q’s are 
smiling; the P’s look somewhat brighter: It seems just possible that 
the dumb philosophy professor may have understood their problem.) 
I am going to start from scratch with the grading (not completely 
true), and I am going to change the way I calculate your marks. 
Each answer is going to count only one mark, and the whole 
question paper out of two. Of course then you can answer the 
question, even if you have only one fact ... (The Q block – they are 
in competition with the P block – now roars unprofessionally with 
laughter ...)  
I proceed to explain how one approaches an essay type of question: 
how to analyse the question first, and only after that produce a 
schema, an allocation of time, and then answer the question. And 
then I proceed with the day’s scheduled work ... After class the P’s 
sent a delegation to come and apologise for the behaviour of the 
Q’s.  
Comes the end of year exam. A day or two before the paper will be 
written, a knock at the door. In the passage about fifteen students 
from group P.  
Representative: Prof, we still do not know where to find 100 facts 
about X, Y, or Z. And this time it is going to be worse: we have to 
answer three questions of 100 marks each in only two hours. We 
are really afraid of answering your paper. (I loose courage – since it 
is their final exam, these youngsters’ degrees are now dependent on 
me!)  
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I: People, I am more concerned than you are at this stage. To me it 
appears that, for three full years, through about 20 module exams, 
and as many midterm tests, and still more class tests, you have only 
done multiple-choice question papers. This is against the rules – 
lecturers are not allowed to set all papers that way.  
Voice from class: Do you mean “monkey puzzles” Prof?  
I: If you promise not to go and complain that I called you “monkeys”, 
then the answer is “yes”.  
Lady: Not true Prof. We did a lot of monkey puzzles, but we also 
had to give written answers.  
I: You got me with that one. If you had to formulate your answers in 
written form all the time, why are you so afraid of essay type 
questions? You know what to do, don’t you?  
Lady: (Her face is very serious. An expression which says some 
professors are truly handicapped): No professor, not essays. We 
wrote paragraphs! It works like this: if the question counts out of five, 
then one needs five facts, and if ten, then one needs ten facts in 
your paragraph.  
I: And if the question counts out of 100, then ... (Her face brightens – 
even the most handicapped professor can finally figure out their 
problem!)  
About two weeks later I drop in at a colleague who teaches 
discipline Q. When I ask why their students were only required to 
write short factual paragraphs, she points to the stack of two 
hundred exam scripts on her desk.  
One year later. I teach that compulsory module again. I decide to 
give the students value for their money. I shall teach them how to 
ask and answer questions, how to plan the answer. This is the 
essence of method. Using model questions, I train them. No 
memoranda – no parrotting – analysis and synthesis. I give them 
assignment topics in the format of research problems.  
One can become dumber by learning. Even clever students can 
become dumber at university. Lippezaner horses can learn to 
dance, but they do not produce the music or devise the steps. When 
I listen to some of my colleagues, they work like old Lippezaners – 
they know and give the recipes. And their students follow their 
example.  
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One of the students from group Q, not a star student (she got about 
65% in tests) appears with her assignment, late. I do not like it when 
students hand in assignments late, since I seldom have an 
assistant, and I experience extreme time pressure with grading. 
However, after reprimanding her a bit, she tells me that she 
appreciates the fact that I take care to grade and write comments, 
continuing:  
I really pity some lecturers. The poor people do not know 
whether they are coming or going. This one lecturer in discipline 
P – actually he is cute: explains things well – couldn’t get to 
giving us a midterm test. So he gave an assignment for 
homework, in order to get an admission mark for the exam. It 
was near the end of semester. So he finds this clever way of 
grading: If your reference list contains more than six sources, 
you get 100. If you have at least three, you get 80. And if you 
have two, you get 60. You know, I always get around 65 – I am 
not a top student. I fact I think I am a bit dumb. This time I got 
only sixty, since I had only two sources. But at least I read 
them, and analysed them. Many of those who got 100 simply 
collected titles from the library catalogue, and they copied from 
one another. The lecturer had no time to really take us 
seriously.  
Another year passes by, and I throw in the towel against economy of 
scale! I start looking for ways to process “students” too.  
What is the issue then?  
• Economics of scale forms part of the big-business model applied 
to even small educational institutions. In any large group of 
students (“clients”), there will be a number who do not want too 
much value for their money, for it implies they must carry part of 
the responsibility for their own education and training. They have 
already imbibed the neo-hedonistic values of late capitalism. 
They refuse the anxiety of personal production. Professionalism 
reigns, but we produce weaker professionals, who are sent out 
into the public arena by far not ready for “life” in its complexities. 
• Academic staff  are overloaded, and in order to produce the 
necessary output, they economise in the ways of accompanying 
their students. They take technical short cuts, and in fact are 
pressurised to do this, for the sake of increased throughput within 
the context of growing massification. It is simply a survival 
strategy.  
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• One of the most serious problems is the neglect of the humanities 
and the social sciences as a necessary base for every 
profession. Professional specialisation is necessary, but equally 
necessary for a good professional is understanding of, or at least 
sensitivity for the life contexts in which professionals work. 
Professionals have to be introduced to these life contexts by way 
of contextualising their studies, as well as by being surrounded by 
such colleagues in their profession.  Good knowledge of Greek 
and Hebrew may be necessary for a minister of religion, in order 
to do exegesis, but Ph.D.’s in both languages still do not make 
good ministers.2 Engineers in practice have indicated that they 
need a wider context in their study programmes than only 
technical expertise (cf. Van Vuuren, 1992:3). 
Are we not presently engaging in the dumbing down of ourselves 
and our students to technicians (cut-and-pasters, imitators, and 
technical data collectors)? And how can we return to a position of 
responsible renewal of knowledge? 
In response to these questions, I am going to argue that “market”-
determined “innovationism” in university training leads to a 
stereotypical kind of scholarship, whilst a more culturally contextual 
approach may result in better graduates, even for technical 
professions. We are being limited in our sense of worthwhile 
knowing under pressure of economy of scale. Secondly, I shall try to 
indicate possibilities for a more creative, yet responsible scholarly 
education of our students, by being sensitive to historical and 
normative contexts, and by being imaginative in a disciplined way, 
taking on challenging problems playfully, and working on an abstract 
level in a logical and morally responsible way.  
                                      
2 Exactly at a time when even more money than before is allocated to train 
engineers in South Africa (there are unemployed engineers, and there has been 
a brain drain of them), the case of Tammy, who died because of physical abuse 
by his adoptive mother, makes headlines: The Sunday Times states in an 
editorial: “There are over a million orphans in South Africa and there are 
thousands of South Africans willing and able to open their hearts and homes to 
these children. We need the services of more, dedicated social workers to 
ensure that these children find the love they need to thrive and do not end up 
like Tammy Herman (Sunday Times, 2006; see Anon., 2006). Another issue 
which “market readers” keep on forgetting is that a proportional relationship 
exists between the number of engineers employable and the number of 
technicians available, and also, in developing countries, a positive relationship 
between effective government spending and the employment of engineers.  
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2. Science and culture – innovationism  
In a former article (Venter, 2006) I argued that it is not possible for 
institutional education to fully reproduce the circumstances of the 
work situation, as the mainstream interpretations of “outcomes-
based education” tend to require. Time and again the world of work 
seems to ask for the impossible – a completely trained employee. 
This does not mean that I am choosing for the other opposite – the 
“ivory tower”. I do believe that there are ways in which to consider 
the work situation, yet remain a university in the “traditional” sense 
of the word. This is why I am pleading for a decrease in early 
specialisation, and a more contextual approach.  
Suppose, however, that institutional education could successfully 
imitate the industrial workshop production structure. This approach 
would factually change university education from a culturally 
contextualised, scholarly knowledge apprenticeship, to purely 
technical training in production techniques. This training in 
production tecniques will then, however, too easily become training 
without reflection about such techniques, and still within a cultural 
context, but without critically rethinking this, or even explicating it. In 
some areas contemporary universities have already gone very far 
on the road of work-simulation, although the degree of simulation 
remains suspect.  
Proposition 2:  
Good scholarship transcends technical training and innovation 
by taking account of the cultural foundations in which it is 
rooted. 
Scholarship is born from a cultural context, and supported and 
sustained by it. Students of the humanities know that even the 
natural sciences, and especially the world of engineering, are rooted 
in a cultural tradition, and practised in terms of such a tradition.  
• The shift from the organismic to the mechanistic world picture in 
the seventeenth century after the advent of automatic machines 
is a case in point (Venter, 1992; 1997). This shift, furthermore, 
had a clear influence on the practice of medical science, and 
soon after also of social science.  
• A more difficult example, but very significant, is the issue of 
balancing the books (accounting) in Renaissance international 
trade practices. On the one hand it stimulated the growth of 
abstract balances called algebraic equations, and on the other 
hand it provided the context in which the metaphor of 
364   Koers 71(2, 3, 4) 2006:375-395 
 J.J. Venter 
gravitational equilibrium could find expression, not only in 
physics, but also in economics, evolutionary ecology under 
natural selection, and even in some ways of expressing the so-
called law of entropy (cf. Venter, 1997). Given the calculative 
balance sheet, and even more, the equilibrium approach, science 
appears like a neutral technique, or a “pragmatic method without 
dogma”, rather than the product of a cultural development, a 
religious attitude, a socio-political power struggle, economic 
privilege, or aims of control, and more.  
Even though it is going to be an important context of, and directly 
influence the work situation, few students in technical fields are 
made to think about human rights and transformation, and few 
students in the humanities, and especially the economic sciences, 
are forced to think about the human implications of the technology 
from which they are going to make money. Thus, at a recent 
international congress, a South African owner of a biotechnology 
company, but trained as an advocate, argued that those who object 
to experiments to develop superhuman biotechnologically are 
superstitious and endanger human dignity (Jordaan, 2006). He 
apparently has never studied the history of the right to dignity, which 
among others has its roots in previous attempts to create a 
superhuman race.3  
If we want to produce responsible yet creative graduates, an 
understanding not only of the history of science, but also of the 
history of culture is needed, as well as a very deep sense of 
how metaphors and other imaginative forms of expression 
function in science/scholarship. Such a cultural explanation of 
our processes of ‘academic knowing’ will contribute to a healthy 
relativising of present ways of understanding and thinking (and 
therefore a sense of our dependence on our predecessors).  
Such an approach will also unmask the reductionist view that all 
science is only quantifiable fact and law, for both established “facts” 
and acknowledged “laws” are the products of the cultural formatting 
of that which we abstract from the “reality-process”.  
                                      
3 Although the idea of “human dignity” has been formulated by the Stoics and 
Cicero about two millennia ago, it only became a protected right after World War 
II, partly because of the treatment of people as subhuman, and of the attitude of 
being superior. The introduction to the United Nations Charter (1945), and its 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), show this 
background very clearly.  
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However: sensitivity for such cultural formatting is disappearing from 
the mind of young natural scientists.  
• The historical sense is diminishing as even photographs and brief 
biographies of scientists are disappearing from contemporary 
textbooks.  
• The “literature-study” sections in post-graduate theses are 
artificially limited to only the most recent publications (say: of the 
last three years) on a very narrow (so-called “focused”) topic.  
• The date of publication goes upfront in the Harvard reference 
method. The impression is created that what is older, is 
irrelevant. This lack of historical sense makes the reading of 
Einstein irrelevant, and anachronistically induces absurd 
references such as: “Plato, 1992 ….”. Dating one’s work is not a 
neutral activity. The ideological striving after constant innovation 
(not the unpredictable quantum jump of creativity), in the 
competitive capitalist society has created the impression that the 
recent is both the new and the important. Old experiences are not 
important, not remembered, and thus sometimes reinvented! In 
fact the non-experienced future is the most important. However, 
for a long time the other extreme reigned. In the Middle Ages the 
adage was: “What is old, is good, and what is good, is old.” 
Backdating one’s own authorship to an ancient famous 
predecessor was one way of expressing this, as in the case of 
the Gnostics and Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. In fact even 
modern and recent writers, before the fragmenting of tradition a 
few decades ago, tried to find predecessors in ancient times (the 
most recent being the New Age occultists who boast that their 
spirituality goes back to ancient wisdom, much older than 
Christianity).4  
• The role of the histories of economics, economic thought, and the 
economy itself, is diminished or even disappears from the 
teaching programmes of faculties of economic sciences.  
As Latour says: yesterday has become the trash can of today’s 
history (Latour, 1994:5 ff.). Therefore: some tiny bit of yesterday’s 
theory becomes today’s unchallengeable technique, or undisputed 
                                      
4 One reviewer made the strange remark that I, myself, am guilty of such absurd 
references. In case readers feel that too, please note that this formalism is part 
of the standardisation required by this journal. It does not make my argument 
against such formalisms invalid.  
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fact (computers and numbers [supposedly] cannot lie!), but they also 
become tomorrow’s crumpled up scribbles in the trash can. We 
learn to “know” and “live” in an eventualistic way, uncritical of the 
way we are carrying the past underneath the surface of our work, 
and unable to be responsibly critically-creative. 
3. Limits and limiting of techno-scientism 
There are real limits to knowing by and through technical 
standardisation. Scientists have themselves noted that the absence 
of different schools in a discipline, and the dominance by paradigm 
leaders who earn large sums of money, have transformed science 
into a boring business with not enough inter-subjective controls 
(Highfield, 1997:24). Also, some elements in the private sector are 
slowly beginning to acknowledge that the standardised thinking 
processes of the “hard” sciences lead to inflexible, stereotypical 
approaches to problems (Henzler, 1990). 
Propostion 3:  
Views of contemporary technicism, economism, and scientism 
are expressed at university level in the forms of formalistic, 
bureaucratic technical management, and the training of 
students in recipes for research and professional work.  
3.1 Techno-managerial faddism versus authority 
Important managerial fads of the past decades very often had their 
origin in the thinking of engineers attempting to design organisations 
after the analogy of designing machines – a more literal 
organisational engineering than the positivists ever dreamt of. Some 
of these guru authors are only now realising that (ironically) 
efficiency, but especially creativity and innovation, have suffered 
because they have neglected “the human factor” (Henzler, 1990). 
They have transformed managers into engineer-technicians who 
keep the organisational engine going. 
Of course the “engine” is de-subjectivised – it is not asked for an 
opinion, and is not allowed to talk back. The methods and aims of 
the authoritarian business manager may be the only admissible 
aims and methods valid inside the firm (in the name of shareholder 
value), but he/she is at least accountable to shareholders. University 
managers and councils do not represent shareholders, so at 
universities managerial authoritarianism can be worse. Kuhn and 
Geis have analysed the effects on commitment of staff which this 
tendency has: they slip down from core commitment (sharing the 
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ideals of the organisation) to calculative commitment (focusing on 
remuneration rather than ideals), and finally to cog commitment (just 
turning with the other gears in the machine, not seeing reason for 
any initiatives). (Cf. Kuhn & Geis, 1988:159.) 
While neo-liberal economists assure us that the only guarantor of 
“freedom” is the unfettered market, both private and academic 
sector employees have the experience of very authoritarian 
managers who use managerial techniques to manipulate staff into 
submission to their aims and methods. This is not simply a 
personality problem in the manager, who may not even be 
conscious of it. It is rather a product of neo-pragmatist 
“managerialism” as an ideology.  
Proposition 4:  
Neo-pragmatist capitalism is one of the most authoritarian 
forms of managerocracy. 
Pragmatism is methodistic – the means or methods or techniques 
that “work” is the the truth. And when the pragmatist says “it works”, 
he/she means that the intended goal has been reached. 
Individualistic capitalism feels very much at home with the 
pragmatism of William James: “it works” means “it works for me” 
(James, 1970:20 ff., 41 ff., 131 ff.). Thus in the private sector, it 
“works” when it works for the CEO. But the buck does not stop with 
him/her: he/she is accountable to the directors, shareholders, and in 
some sense to organised staff. In the academic world then, it 
“works” when it works for the CEO (rector/principal) – but: he/she is 
responsible and accountable to whom? (This state of affairs invites 
political intervention in totalitarian democracies, where politicians 
pretend to “represent” the interests of all of “society”.) The long 
tradition of collegial leadership at universities has collapsed under 
the pressures of the “market”, which now determines the ways in 
which universities are led.5
                                      
5 As I was in the process of finally editing this article, South African education 
minister, Naledi Pandor, expressed her concern about the huge salaries some 
vice-chancellors of universities claim for themselves. I do agree with her. 
However, guidelines by politicians about such salaries will not solve the 
problem. State intervention – the mergers, SAQA. HEQC, and affirmative action 
– have helped create huge bureaucracies. Government salaries (municipal 
managers), private sector salaries, competing with overseas standards, are all 
part of the problem. There are universities where the VC’s are not necessarily 
overpaid, but huge bureaucracies swallow up a large component of income, 
while strictly controlling the salaries of academics, and creating red tape that 
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There is an important issue in this respect: technical expertise in 
management is not the same as authority.  
• Authority presupposes the understanding of the norms/ 
conditions applicable to the whole situation, and the way(s) to 
realise them (cf. Venter, 1987:115 ff.). One can be an 
authoritarian technical manager without being an authoritative, 
respected manager. Authority is a kind of wisdom not dependent 
on technical expertise.  
• Pragmatism is one of the irrationalistic heirs of Positivism. Thus 
it promotes techno-scientism and technical management. It still 
searches for progress through tough-minded empirical 
experiment and technical planning (Dewey, 1916). Thus the 
technical manager’s aims will determine the planning, and the 
planning will determine the experiments selected in order to find 
the way forward. In the context of a university this approach 
becomes acute and serious at ground level – via institutional 
structuring based on the over-simplified principle of “structure 
follows function/strategy”, an epistemology and a philosophy of 
education/training is imposed. Management determines the aims, 
and implement them by technical means. Management 
determines the budget, and the budget is prioritised according to 
management’s priorities. Thus the means to do the work is 
determined (on the whole) by management: this includes 
research methods used and the educational approach. Techno-
scientist managers tend to look at qualitative research as 
expensive in staff, and untrustworthy in character, and may easily 
reduce the human teaching staff in favour of more “machines”. 
University managers may make serious mistakes in selecting 
aims, and in finding the right connection between aims chosen 
and means provided,6 but the intellectuals in the lecture room 
and the laboratory/library have to make the (sometimes 
unworkable) plans work (and usually they will), for they chose a 
career directly connected with the future of the world, in and 
through the younger generation. All over the world, well-
established collegial institutions of universities (faculty boards, 
                                                                                                              
consumes the time of productive academics. Managerial bureaucracy loves 
intransparency, so they are often beyond accountability. 
6 The business world has found a “cas-evac” procedure for its failed 
“managerocrats” – the “golden handshake”: preventing both parties from losing 
face through one party sacrificing money. However, I have not actually heard 
about any university CEO receiving a golden handshake!  
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senates), have been rendered powerless by management. The 
new approach – rationalised in terms of economy of scale – 
sometimes does bring financial advantages, but the quality of 
output in graduates has, in my opinion, decreased considerably.  
• The power principle in this respect is ideological in the bad 
sense of a controlling and manipulative idea, incarnated in 
powerful human beings. It is subterfuge to say that after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall there is no ideology left. When a whole society is 
manipulated into accepting an idea of knowledge, human living, 
and valuable reality, then it surely is under the yoke of an 
ideology – it is under suppression of ideas which are incarnated 
in power relationships. 
In the following paragraphs I am going to look very briefly at the 
limitations of the new approach, both in terms of the demands 
placed on the scholar, and in terms of the coping strategies devised, 
and the results thereof.  The technical approach is over-
emphasised, and academics follow the lead (or the pressure) of 
management in this regard.  
3.2 The limits of technical training 
In another article (see footnote 3 referring to Venter, 2006) these 
issues have been treated in more detail. I summarise some of the 
relevant arguments from it:  
• Although required by the OBE principle, it is impossible in a 
formal educational institution to completely unify the world of 
study and the world of work. Employers want universities to 
produce professionals who can do the “job” right away. Not even 
engineering laboratories at a university can be real simulations of 
the external work situation.  
• Factually very few engineers and natural scientists remain in their 
disciplines for much longer than five years, after which they move 
into management (or become part of the brain drain). Or worse: 
they become managerial gurus with very limited experience of 
practical management.  
• Given the problems already caused by such shifts of career, the 
revision/reduction of the purely technical component of training 
needs serious consideration. Finding a slot in the programmes for 
training in philosophy and aesthetics may be a time and cost 
effective way to create sensitivity for the quality of human life. 
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3.3 Worthwhile knowing 
Yet not only the human factor suffers from technicist training. 
Epistemologies, philosophies, worldviews, determine what we see 
as worthwhile to investigate, or to transfer to others. The new 
ideological approach is skewing our sense of worthwhile knowing. 
And technical creativity itself is inhibited by this new stereotypical 
thinking. Some business leaders are trying to overcome this by 
exposing their staff to artists (sic!), writers (sic!) and philosophers 
(sic!) (Henzler, 1990). 
Proposition 5:  
The “market reader’s” indications of what is worthwhile to 
know, does not necessarily lead to “quality” or responsible 
scholarship. 
We are slowly but surely being limited in our sense of worthwhile 
knowing by the supposition that quality knowledge is more or less 
limited to marketable knowledge and programmes. We are blinkered 
into the narrow belief that the only way to live (physically, 
biologically, and even culturally) is to be full participants in the formal 
or measurable market. Experts in economic sciences teach this view 
in their classes, and in regular radio and TV interviews. The variety 
of cultural expression, even within the field of economic agency, is 
left out of perspective (something for museum anthropologists). After 
Mandeville (beginning of the 18th century) no theory of economics I 
know of took account of the economics of crime, or of unpaid, 
voluntary work (usually done by women). The economic practices 
(self-sustenance) of desert communities still need to be studied. 
Why? We could possibly learn how to handle very scarce resources 
responsibly.  
A more serious indication of this trend is the very one-sided 
promotion of certain scholarly disciplines by politicians, managers, 
and public relations officials of universities, by businessmen, and 
labour unions, while others are reduced to bare shells or eliminated 
from curricula. This direction is almost deterministically enforced by 
that empty concept of “excellence” as “competitiveness”, double-
checked by the universal “audit”.7 Competitiveness is given some 
content in terms of the values of consumerism, the (non-productive) 
                                      
7 My article about the new bureaucratic control mechanism of the “universal audit” 
will appear in the Proceedings of the FISP Congress held in Istanbul, in 2003 (to 
be published in 2006). 
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entertainment sector and financial market economies.8 The growing 
presence of future professional sports stars attached to the 
academe is but one form of this.  
In good academic tradition “quality” has until recently not been 
measured simply in terms of minimising costs, time-to-market, and 
maximising output and income, or even throughput. The “market”, or 
“competition”, does not guarantee quality; rather quality supports 
competitiveness. Quality is often a sustained and known tradition. 
Good academic quality resides not simply in the ability to follow the 
rules and the recipes that work for some(body’s?) goal/gain, but 
rather in good yet relevant work in areas where financial gain and 
direct solutions of problems are not the primary focus. Famous 
works like Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica and 
Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions took a very long time to 
conceive and write. They did not directly serve the building of a 
bridge or a change in interest rates, and they probably did not make 
money fast (compared to some of the technical and one-sided 
faddist intellectual products which became best-sellers within a short 
period).  
Technical scientists tend to ignore the role of imagination in science 
and the academe at large. Yet no abstraction process, and no 
construction of theories and models can ever take place outside the 
productive process of a disciplined imagination.  
This statement requires a concept of “relevance” that transcends 
pure utility, and serves as a norm for interaction with the contextual 
burning issues to which the techniques are applied. Such a concept 
of relevance could include standing in the shoes of great scientists 
in order to “see” the issues from their perspective (as far as 
possible), and to imagine how they overcame the limitations in vision 
and technique of their day. This may be the most creative, but also 
the least expensive part of a student’s training. Technicism, 
however, tends to ask firstly for the hard material instruments and 
the ability to use them.  
                                      
8 Presently one of the strong factors in my university’s way of determining salaries 
of academic staff is the median of salaries calculated for 500 companies of 
“similar” staff compositions.  In order to determine how deviation from this 
median is needed, the scarcity factor of the scholar’s expertise within the 
“market” is determined. On asking how the scarcity factor of an astrophysicist 
would be determined, I got no answer.  
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The semi-materialist belief that the resetting of the material “base” 
will take care of socio-cultural problems in the “super-structure” has 
penetrated everywhere into capitalist society, also into education. In 
developing countries socio-cultural problems are different from those 
in the developed ones. The pain of human relationships in rich 
countries, however, shows that solving problems of material welfare 
does not also “causally” solve socio-cultural problems. Ideological 
pragmatics, which should be searching for the workable, shows a 
strange resistance to relinquish beliefs which have not worked for 
centuries – these beliefs unreasonably sustain themselves. Such is 
the (ideological) belief that the improvement of the material base 
automatically improves conditions in the superstructure. This belief 
originated in the 18th century free market model of Turgot, was 
taken somewhat further by Adam Smith, changed into a dialectic by 
Marx, and still hides behind the story that the “market” promotes 
(even guarantees) freedom, welfare, and good culture, as the 
Monetarists and the neo-Classical economists would want us to 
believe (cf. Venter, 1997a:5-8; 2002a:289-300; 2002d:425 ff.). 
This kind of argument is also valid for science/scholarship in general 
– machines/technical apparatus cannot solve problems without 
human intervention/control. But if human intervention does not 
include socio-cultural understanding, we may solve a present detail 
problem technologically, but not sustainably. However: under-
standing the context may lead to a responsible transforming of the 
techniques, under the guidance of:  
• justice in designing and producing anything, like a car (which 
implies a responsible relationship between safety and afford-
ability); or  
• taking account of quality of life in the planning of a city (a quality 
partially determined by the aesthetic planning of an area);9  
• of dignity and rights in biotechnology, human development or 
environmental care. 
Then: why not teach engineers some social philosophy and town 
planners artistic design?  
                                      
9 Those of us who have seen utility architecture in residential quarters of 
Communist-era housing in Eastern Europe will know that these areas are 
almost uninhabitable. 
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Note: the “trans-disciplinary” aggregates that are now presented as 
academic programmes and team research, lack disciplinary depth 
as well as visionary integration. The humanities can help to provide 
both, i.e. the depth of insight for all technically trained intellectuals.  
3.4 Scholarship, scientific control, and human subjectivity 
Of serious concern is the scientistic tendency to forget the 
subjectivity of human beings and the need to live in a humane 
society. One of the dangerous factors is the erosion of normative 
concepts like “human dignity”.  
Proposition 6:  
Modernity’s tension between the “absoluteness” of the human 
being and its “naturalistic” origins, is collapsing in favour of 
naturalism, combined with a desire for scientistic control of all 
human life, and thus of dehumanising the human being in 
scholarship.  
Kant already faced a dilemma with regard to the above-mentioned 
issue. His concept of dignity – never to treat any rational creature 
merely as an instrument10 – presupposes that other human beings 
are recognisably “rational” through their actions. But exactly at this 
point lies a serious problem: Kant believed that humankind in the 
initial (“childhood”) stage (“nature”), is dominated by his subrational 
(“natural”) faculties. Yet, inevitably, maturing over thousands of 
years, progress towards a rational, cultural, social life has taken 
place. “Nature” in fact, is the driving force towards such an 
autonomous rationality. However, progress towards this position is 
inevitably delayed, since it is exactly the subrational (“natural”) 
faculties, under conditions of conflict and competition, that carry this 
progress. “Reason” is too peaceful and fair to be the motor of 
progress; one needs aggression for it. The kingdom of reason is the 
immanent eschatology in Kant’s historical universe – it is the destiny 
of eternal peace for the mature human race.11 In fact, the ordinary 
                                      
10 The third formula of the Categorical Imperative reads as follows: “Act so as to 
use humanity, whether in your own person, or in the person of another, always 
as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant, 1901:246). On the previous page, 
Kant explains human existence as one which has “absolute value”. Significantly 
in fascism dignity is the very opposite: it is being subject to the will of the leader 
as the incarnation of the state, and to sacrifice oneself for the state. The two 
views, however, share the importance of conflict as ennobling. 
11 The idea of the maturation of the human race towards rationality as its 
destination came to the fore very prominently in the periods of the 
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(unemancipated) human being does not even know “nature’s” aim. 
But (the enlightened) Kant does know both “nature’s” aim, and he 
knows that for the overall majority this aim has not (yet) been 
reached. How then to recognise the struggling, miserable beings as 
so special (human) that they are not to be used merely as 
instruments? This question highlights Kant’s tense views of being 
“enlightened” and “enlightenment”: 
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred 
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own 
understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity 
is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack 
of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of 
another. The motto of the enlightenment is therefore: Sapere 
aude. Have courage to use your own understanding (Kant, 
1994:54).  
The dilemma in short: Kant accuses ordinary human beings of “self-
caused” immaturity, and yet he argues that “nature” is the cause of 
the rate of maturation. He insists that humankind is on the way to 
rationality, yet lives under a strict determinism of “nature”. Kant 
himself has apparently already reached the dignity of being maturely 
rational – imposing the laws of morality and nature onto the world! 
It is the latter pretence which is of concern. Since Descartes the 
rational scientist has been claiming control of nature (Descartes, 
s.a., 51, par.1, part six). This stance leaves Kant in a severe 
dialectical tension between control (used as an instrument) and 
autonomy (recognising the human being as absolute in its own right 
and an end in itself).  
Soon after Kant the dialectical see-saw would tip over to the side of 
viewing the human being as merely a “natural” being, no different 
from any other natural being. This “natural” being was thence 
assumed to be subject to scientific control, remaking, and technical 
reproduction.  
In the supposedly “scientifically objective” comedies of the positivist 
Darwinist doctor, Chekov, ordinary human beings are ridiculed and 
stripped of all their dignity. Only the doctor as scientist remains in 
                                                                                                              
Enlightenment, and in Modernity as a whole. It is the hidden lifeview core of the 
story of humanity in Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, in the doctrine of the 
emancipation of the human race in G.E. Lessing, in Rousseau’s vision of the 
social contract, in the theories of competition of Turgot, Smith, Kant, Darwin, 
and in the philosophies of history of Hegel, Comte, Marx, Godwin, and others.  
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control of himself, and through his scientific technical skills (pills!) to 
some extent in control of other human beings (cf. for example The 
Seagull). But listen to a contemporary adherent of technicist 
scientism speaking:  
Human subjectivity does not exist – and this is the true kernel of 
Skinner’s theory – beyond Nature, but is part of it and resides 
within it. By making its physical nature an object, the human 
being also makes its subjectivity an object – and thus a part of 
Nature. The strict difference between subjectivity and Nature, 
which forms the basis for the concept of human dignity, 
disappears ... Nothing could be more short-sighted at this point 
than the objection that this scientific penetration and 
technological control only apply to the natural side of the human 
being, not to its spiritual side and subjectivity ... 
(Bayertz, 1996:86). 
The discourse of the Skinnerians turns the progressivistic Enlighten-
ment discourse against itself. Modernity got rid of the medieval 
divine “supernaturalism” (God intervening from outside natural 
history), by introducing a naturalist supernaturalism. For modernity 
the “supernatural” emerges from the “natural” – out of the natural 
“base” (matter, organic life, instincts, sentiments) emerges rational 
subjectivity, and elevates itself above the “natural”.  
But the Skinnerians simply flattened this double storey on the basis 
of an extreme scientism, arguing: since subjectivity emerges from 
the “natural”, then it must be simply (or no more than) “natural”, and 
has to be completely opened up to the procedures of the natural 
sciences.  
The idea of nature had already also been suitably reduced by the 
techno-scientism of Modernity itself, by Descartes and even more 
explicitly by Enlightenment rationalism (cf. Venter, 2001; 2002c). 
The behaviourists had an easy task to twist the ambiguous 
naturalistic discourse of the humanist Moderns in the direction of a 
clear-cut naturalism that denies all special dignity to the human 
being, and propagates exactly the instrumentalising which Kant tried 
to resist or prevent. One might characterise this twisting of discourse 
as the final flattening of the medieval double story (“natural-
supernatural”) discourse.  
When science as maker no longer cares about the dignity of the 
human being, then the following requirements become evident: 
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• The necessity to confront all scientists with human subjectivity. 
Gabriel Marcel refers to the free subjectivity, even of the body (cf. 
Venter, 2002b:362), and warns not to treat it as purely instrument 
or disposable object.  
• The imperative to expose the narratives of mastery and control 
for what they are: dangerous pretence.12 Scientists who deny 
dignity are in the company of those ideologues against whom the 
United Nations pronounced the right to dignity directly after World 
War II.  
• The insistence on the limitations of all control. Everything 
produced by science at some stage has to be reintroduced into 
“nature”. At the point of re-entry human control is weakened or 
lost. And as Von Hayek indicated, given the fact that we are part 
of the whole which we study, all attempts to be in control must 
necessarily end in totalitarian dictatorship over the little area 
where we feel we are in control (cf. Venter, 1996:230 ff.). 
Descartes hoped for control over all of “nature”. Thus we have to 
take a good look at the beliefs that inform human control, and 
under what conditions control takes place.  
Given the limitations of techno-scientific control, and its dangers, the 
issue of playfulness and disciplined imagination comes back onto 
the agenda – the more constructive side of this article. Scholarship 
is a serious responsibility, but the play of ideas/thoughts, when 
guided by sound criteria, may improve responsible outcomes above 
that which marketable technology can reach.  
4. Human sciences and scholarly creativity 
Creative scholars very often (more often than not?) show a 
playfulness or experimental attitude that pushes the borders of 
                                      
12 “Master narrative – how else to translate Lyotard’s grand récit? And in this 
translation we glimpse the terms of another analysis of modernity’s demise, one 
that speaks not of the incompatibility of various modern narratives, but instead 
of their fundamental solidarity. For what made the grand récits of modernity 
master narratives if not the fact that they were all narratives of mastery, man 
seeking his telos in the conquest of nature? What function did these narratives 
play other than to legitimise Western man’s self-appointed mission of 
transforming the entire planet in his own image? And what form did this mission 
take if not that of man’s placing of his stamp on everything that exists – that is, 
the transformation of the world into a representation, with man as its subject?” 
(Owens, 1987:65). I was writing this article while our TV screens were swamped 
with reports on the Tsunami disaster. At least it denied one tenet of Modernity: 
that rational human beings can be lords and possessors of nature.  
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“method”, and experienced “reality” as known to their con-
temporaries. “Creativity” overcomes present systems of rules: 
There is a marked difference between creative and innovative 
work. Creative work disrupts habitual ways of thinking. 
Innovative work utilises habit, tradition, and culture, to arrive at 
new ways of doing things. The steps in innovation are 
incremental and do not involve breakthroughs and quantum 
jumps. Innovation is needed to deal with problems that interfere 
with the achievement of collective objectives … Creativity, on 
the other hand, depends on the presence of gifted people who 
are capable of escaping from the channels of thought that are 
intrinsic to the culture of organisations. Creative people tend to 
be disruptive, while innovators support the social structure upon 
which they depend.  
Creativity and innovation involve different modes of thinking. 
The movement in thought processes is vertical in creativity, 
from highly structured and disciplined to loose, associative and 
symbolic. The vertical movement is from secondary process 
thinking, which is sequential as well as logical, to primary 
process thinking, which is characteristic of the unconscious. 
The innovator applies horizontal modes of thinking. While 
horizontal thinking uses analogies and past experience, it 
depends on a limited number of styles of thinking, the most 
predominant being linear reasoning and successive trials. 
Innovation therefore involves lower levels of emotion and less 
anxiety (Zaleznick, 1988:38-39). 
The troubles which students experienced in my class (given in the 
introductory story), have their roots in avoidance strategies. They 
were avoiding the anxieties of thinking for themselves; they rather 
opted for a collectivising process, guided in every way by the 
lecturer.  
Proposition 7:  
The client type of student is a risk-avoiding consumer, and 
economy of scale changes scholars into risk-avoiding 
producers. Good training would support students in taking 
responsible risks with regard to challenging problems. 
Being a self-learner rather than being prescribed to, is not a new 
idea at all. It is simply the only approach worthy of a university. 
However, the “client” type of student does not buy into this – they 
want the opposite, namely to consume “facts”. And economics of 
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scale often forces lecturers to provide just such consumerism. The 
system works like a machine, mechanically orderly13. And yet 
students come out of such a system, trained in techniques and facts 
that will either be outdated in less than five years after finishing their 
studies, or “everlasting” in their triviality – so trivial that nobody will 
be prepared to pay for it.  
Moreover, students enter the university unprepared. Academic staff 
thus have to cope with students with good potential, but given the 
requirements of economy of scale, are almost powerless to do 
something about it. Two types of scholars develop: The textbook-
and-recipe type, who proceeds with technical research while 
processing students on pure parrot work. The quality academic, who 
tries to get students to the level required, as well as doing research 
(and neglects his/her own humanity by being forced to forget about 
social and family life, and finally leaves the academe totally 
demoralised). How to structure our universities to keep the latter 
kind of scholar in academic leadership? 
4.1 Creative problem statements 
Both short-term technical and factual training, as well as trivialities, 
have now become part of the university scene. Many students (and 
often brilliant lecturers) are therefore not able to adjust their methods 
according to problems facing them. In the immediacy of students’ 
complaints we can see the traits of an oppressive amount of 
conserving the supposedly established, and avoiding new issues.  
However, given some time and personal attention – note: “time” and 
personal – one can attempt to make intellectuals understand the 
differences among static (sometimes suppressive) thinking, 
innovation, and creativity. I have devised a diagram to show 
students’ approaches to statements of problem, since this is where 
their first difficulty appear, and to help them find a responsible 
combination of renewal and conservation. The diagram outlines 
approaches to problem statements, in terms both of the context and 
of its own characteristics. I assume that creativity is responsibly 
disruptive, i.e. it may disrupt “lower” conventions (such as literary 
genres), but will pay respect to “higher” norms (the creative person 
                                      
13  “Ideas have legs”, they say. But they drag their feet. In our days, when 
everybody questions the mechanistic world picture, universities are changed 
into machine by their managers.  
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will not devise a special genre for the propagation of genocide) (cf. 
Venter, 1998:24-28).  
The diagram shows a continuum of approaches to questioning, 
between the extremes of perfect solvability (trivialities) and total 
unsolvability (dilemmas and paradoxes).  
• An example of a trivial question could be:  
(a) “The ring on your finger – is it a wedding ring?”  
(b) Here the answer can directly be obtained from the person 
asked, and can be limited to “yes” or “no” – which will be 
a complete answer.  
• Examples of unsolvable problems would be: 
(a) “Can you explain to the class how to go about 
constructing a square circle?” 
(b) “What was the influence of apartheid on colonialism?” 
In the case of (a) one can play around with the question for fun, but 
it will not be possible to come up with some ingenious answers, 
since the problem includes a contradiction in terms. However, it may 
get the imagination going. In the case of (b) there is somewhat more 
to be done: one has to do some reading in history before one can 
attempt to answer the question. The question will then prove to be 
impossible or very difficult to answer, since colonialism preceded 
apartheid in the strict sense. However, such a challenge gives the 
student the opportunity to criticise the question as such, which puts 
him/her on the way to creative thinking.  
It takes a special kind of teacher to guide students in their 
insecurities, in order to get a responsible relationship between 
conservation and renewal of understanding. The diagram to follows 
links the different mental and emotional factors with renewal and 
discovery, to enable students to weigh risk against security. Weaker 
students (especially the lazy ones), avoid insecurities, and will 
therefore be unhappy in courses which have a more open-ended 
experimental design. Both security and risk are important 
considerations, and one should avoid misleading students into the 
idea that only the risky, new, is worthwhile (the square wheel must 
then be invented). Students need to be guided into experi-
mentation, imaginative alternatives, and management should not 
immediately conclude that insecurity in some students indicate bad 
teaching!  
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Reading the diagram from left to right indicates an order:  
From (i) low risk easily answered questions, (ii) technical 
applied research (such as statistics for marketing), and (iii) 
normal science, through (iv) the balance point into (v) the higher 
risk area of vaguer anomalies, (vi) open-ended systems, (vii) 
metaphoric problematic, (viii) paradigm shifting, to (ix) the basic 
disciplines of philosophy, (x) high risk dialectical problem 
statements, and (xi) finally ending at the other extreme of 
insoluble problems (dilemmas and paradoxes). 
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Different authors (Kuhn’s paradigm theory is but one) point to the 
fact that major creative changes, even in the natural sciences, imply 
a change in basic philosophical concepts.14 It is therefore also not 
far-fetched to suggest, as the diagrammatic model suggests, that 
the basic disciplines of philosophy are markedly positioned in the 
high risk area, and may contribute significantly to creative shifts.  
Normal science lies in the low risk side of the model; it is situated in 
the innovative rather than in the creative zone. To dwell in the region 
from normal science to technical application may produce 
necessary, meaningful, and innovative research results, as well as a 
safe career. To move in this safe zone is in fact what most 
academics do, and the model does not aim at making such 
meaningful work seem nonsensical. (There are some, however, in 
the academic brotherhood, who work in that safe area, but use 
advertising and sales techniques to make it appear as if something 
really new and creative has been produced.)  
Those working in the high risk zone may struggle on the career 
ladder – the results may be few and far between, and gained at high 
cost. Such scholars may even have to suffer distrust in their 
professional abilities from the side of journal editors and safe-side 
colleagues, since they defy the crowd, challenge the rules, have a 
different view of reality, and so forth. (And we must concede: very 
few of us are Newtons, Lavoisiers, Einsteins, Kants, Hegels, or 
Bertrand Russels.) The model indicates, however, that our problem 
statements do need some open-endedness. We have to aim for a 
position slightly to the right of the balance point, if we are looking for 
more than just re-applying standardised procedures which produce 
results similar to what the majority are producing.  
The two directional arrows, “conserving” and “disclosing”, indicate 
something of the way in which we ought to train scholars. Starting 
with established techniques, one proceeds to the more open-ended 
disclosing strategies. Academic creativity does not occur easily if we 
continue working in the “conserving” direction.  
                                      
14 “What is changed by poetic language is our way of dwelling in the world. From 
poetry we receive a new way of being in the world, or orienting ourselves in this 
world. ... If this analysis is sound, we should have to say that metaphor shatters 
not only the previous structures of our language, but also the previous 
structures that we call reality ... The strategy of metaphor is heuristic fiction for 
the sake of redescribing reality. With metaphor we experience the 
metamorphosis of both language and reality” (Ricoeur, 1991:85). 
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Scholarly creativity will, however, not occur without the established 
basic skills either, since they form part of the minimum standards (or 
model) according to which our work is judged as part of scholarly 
work at all. (In this respect the danger of technicism again looms 
very strongly – both with regard to research and to academic journal 
referees, who meticulously guard all the techniques prescribed by 
the standard paradigms, without any flexibility for a new approach).  
The diagram includes further aspects of renewal – taking a 
conserving direction is associated with collectivising. One wonders 
about too many university advertisements asking for “team players” 
(those who do not play for the audience at the cost of the team, but 
maybe also those who do not rock the boat with too much novelty). 
One thus also needs to note that the disruptive effects of a creative 
individual may be quite costly in the economic sense. Business-type 
universities therefore tend to discriminate against individualistic staff 
in favour of “team playing” innovators. The university is, however, 
exactly the place where also such creative individualists should feel 
at home – or be part of another type of “team”.  
4.2 Breaking the rules 
A complex problem exists with regard to the way creative thinkers 
think. They seem to break the rules of rational thinking, because 
they seem to change the logic itself. Ricoeur sensed this (see 
footnote 15).  
Proposition 8:  
For the sake of responsible, but creative graduates, the playful, 
methodological weirdo who does not necessarily generate 
money, must be welcomed at universities, and students, 
including undergraduates, have to be exposed to this kind of 
scholar. 
The above-mentioned statement does not necessarily imply a 
breaking of the rules of basic logic, although creative thinkers may 
disrupt the accepted interpretation of rules in terms of a specific 
paradigm. Not even dialectical thinkers completely deny the validity 
of the principle that one should not contradict oneself. They rather 
reinterpret its way of functioning in terms of a view of how reality 
“develops”.  
It is important to note that the habit-and-rule environment requires 
innovation rather than creativity. This is what Thomas Kuhn alludes 
to when he says that scientists are conservative. They tend to 
cluster around certain basic ideas about reality and method, and to 
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identify good science with their way of doing things. Furthermore, 
they use expensive technology, which cannot easily be replaced, 
and therefore is forced to function within the limitations of their 
capital investment (very often not even realising these limitations). 
Lyotard’s famous work on post-modern knowledge was intended as 
a warning that computer-formalism was going to enforce it over the 
whole spectrum of knowledge processes (cf. Lyotard, 1979:30 ff., 
Chapter 1). Investment seems to create its own truth, rationality, 
acceptable methodology, and these days often cover-up of failure.15   
Those known for so-called “paradigm shifts” have mostly been the 
weirdoes in science and scholarship, and have very often also been 
social “misfits” to a certain extent. Crick and Watson, discovering the 
structure of DNA, are a case in point. Such scholars do not follow all 
the standard techniques, and their basic ideas (metaphors/ 
analogies) do not necessarily come from the discipline in which they 
made the vertical/lateral jump. Some have been philosophical and 
methodological heretics (cf. Mason, 1956; Hooykaas, 197216), and 
very often also very one-sided in their insistence on their ideas 
(which in fact limited them again), while some mainstreamers saw 
them as “unscientific”. Briefly a few cases:  
• The Renaissance was known for its Classicism; its absolute 
idealisation of especially pre-Christian Classics, yet the outcome 
was something quite new. Copernicus, for example, was 
something of an esoteric thinker, a Pythagorean elitist who 
believed that mathematics is only for the initiate. He thought of 
the sun, after the example of Pythagoras and Plato, as a special 
reflection of the divinity. Thus he could only conceive of the sun in 
the neo-Platonist way: as the centre reaching out to the 
circumference. He got away with this probably because of his 
esoteric approach. He circulated his work only among the 
“initiate”; his book was only published while he was on his 
deathbed (on the insistence of a friend). But note: because of his 
Classicism he took a different possibility into account: that the 
                                      
15 It no more seems acceptable to write a Masters in Science, concluding that “my 
hypothesis was wrong”. Sponsors of research want marketable results, not 
academic progress by falsification. Researchers will of course not say this 
publicly, but they do admit to the problem in the tea room.  
16 It is worthwhile to read both these in toto, for both authors constantly come back 
to the role which has been played in the development of science by religious 
people, but not the one hundred percent orthodox.  
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earth was moving around the sun and rotating around its own 
axis. He probably used techniques very similar to those of his 
“opponents” (the Ptolemaeics). According to Kuhn the shift did 
not even immediately imply progress in solving problems (Kuhn, 
1975:75-76), but it did provide a simplification that proved very 
fruitful in the long run. Using another avenue of thought, which 
later proved to be considered heretic by the Catholic Church, 
Copernicus found “new” analogies for a construct of the whole 
visible reality. 
• Antoine Lavoisier is another significant example. Lavoisier 
studied chemistry at a college where the laboratory demonstrator 
was a weirdo himself. The latter tried his utmost to make 
experiments in the laboratory deliver results opposite to those 
predicted by the professor in his lectures. And of course Lavoisier 
came to know about the quantification of physics by Newton. 
Lavoisier became his father’s bookkeeper, and in his private 
laboratory he repeated every one of Priestly’s experiments with 
gases, in order to explain certain thus far inexplicable 
phenomena. He, however, changed the method by quantifying 
according to bookkeeping methods. This approach already 
implies: the experiment is not a complete method. According to 
standard theory phlogiston was supposed to be added in burning 
processes. For Lavoisier this meant that after burning, the ashes 
had to be heavier than the original wood, but the very opposite 
proved to be the case. And thus he searched for that something 
which was lost in the burning process, and finally found oxygen. 
The adherents of the phlogiston theory were not impressed. They 
explained the phenomenon very well by saying that phlogiston 
has “negative weight”. Lavoisier insisted that the books have to 
balance. His analogy: bookkeeping procedures, in order to follow 
the quantitative procedures of Newton (cf. further Gale, 
1979:112 ff.). Hotheadedness and analogies from elsewhere 
changed the face of chemistry through the work of Lavoisier.  
• Mason, in his interesting (although now dated) book, Main 
currents of scientific thought (1956), which covers the centuries of 
Modern science, could not refrain from constantly drawing the 
attention to the fact that important scientists had been openly 
religious, but very often off-centre in their religious allegiances. 
Interestingly Darwin himself was somewhat an off-centre 
theologian. He was not a natural scientist. “Somewhat” off-centre, 
since he was deeply influenced by the deist form of rationalist 
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theology, already fashionable since the Enlightenment. He used 
the medieval concept of what is “fitting for God”,17 to argue that 
God did not create species separately. He was also strongly 
influenced by the mechanistic tradition in economics, especially 
the conflict/competition motive, which he linked up with discourse 
from the advancing technology, as well as cultural practices of 
selection (farmers and pigeon breeders). And finally all these 
elements contributed to a central concept which is the kingpin of 
his whole theory: the metaphor of “natural selection” (cf. Venter, 
1996:209 ff.). 
In all these cases, some rules have been broken. One does not 
need to agree with the product to know that the world considers 
these products as “creative”. In the cases above, we have 
“scientists” producing something “new”, and the “new” is in the 
explanation of “established facts”. The explanation can be 
metaphorical, analogical, or symbolical – the fact is, it does convince 
a large number of peers and intellectuals.  
The explanations may have been one-sided, but even in their one-
sidedness, still covered so many “facts’” requiring an explanation, 
and also covered so much that still needed to be discovered through 
an explanatory lens, that too many people may even have accepted 
them as final. Note, however, that the explanatory coverage 
happens from a certain distance, called “abstraction”.  
Proposition 9:  
Scholarly creativity is born from a disciplined imagination 
working within the rules of good abstraction.  
Where do we then find scholarly creativity? Exactly in this process of 
breaking the rules. This process sets in with hunches and 
                                      
17 The idea of “fittingness” for God has its origins in the Greek philosopher, 
Xenophanes. He criticised as “unfitting” for the gods the tribal structure and 
human behaviour ascribed to them in mythology. Fitting for the one and only 
god would be to view him as simply a thinking consciousness. Parmenides and 
Aristotle expanded on this – the divine became the simple unity of thinking 
subject and thought object. Tertullian fought this kind of rationalism, adopted by 
some Gnostics, saying that God can act contradictorily (given his free will). 
Anselm of Canterbury, however, returned to the rationalist fittingness 
hypothesis, saying that then the will of God is always “rational” – in the human 
sense of the word rational, which means that God cannot contradict himself. 
Darwin uses this perspective to defend a deistic rational God, for whom it is 
“unfitting” to be directly involved in the creation of species. 
386   Koers 71(2, 3, 4) 2006:375-395 
 J.J. Venter 
hypotheses, and supports a deviation from the habitual view of 
“reality”. It is the mentioned distancing: abstraction. 
4.3 Abstraction  
Abstraction has the potential to liberate the imagination from a 
stereotypical approach. In scholarship it may liberate intellectual 
imagination from established disciplinary techniques, opening up 
possibilities to move to the right hand side of the diagram.  
This kind of liberation may, however, lead to difficulties in grading, 
peer evaluation, and career making. From the point of view of the 
paradigmatic establishment, and especially from the point of view of 
economics of scale, surprising abstractions may be resisted as 
“unscientific” and “costly guesswork”, or even “speculation”. What is 
required is good abstraction, i.e. a strong empirical context of 
reference, and a disciplined logical imagination doing the 
abstractions.  
There are different kinds of abstraction:  
• substituting a part for the whole (symbolic abstraction); 
• substituting the individual for the universal (representative 
abstraction); 
• extracting an aspect from the totality (focused abstraction); 
• omitting “irrelevant” details from a complex structure or network 
(simplifying abstraction). 
• Moving from the individual to the universal (generalising 
abstraction)  
I do not claim that my analysis of abstraction is exhaustive; it 
remains a first attempt. However, distinguishing types of abstraction 
opens up different possible ways of looking at the same reality, i.e. it 
allows for different kinds of twisting of hitherto accepted “reality 
constructs”. Severe twisting of well-established reality constructs 
can give the impression of a total change of “reality” itself.  
• Symbolic abstraction 
Symbols are open-ended and ambiguous, and thus make it possible 
to find aspects not hereto accentuated before. Symbolism is 
stronger in fine arts and literature, because it oversteps the 
boundaries of disciplined abstraction further than may be allowed for 
in scholarly work. It can therefore open up avenues of potential for 
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the scholar, upon which to test a disciplined imagination. The use of 
symbols has been further abstracted into the use of signs in 
mathematics and logic, making symbolical abstraction available for 
use in generalising abstraction.  
• Representative abstraction 
• Individuals are experientially nearer to us, and finding the 
coherence of their multiple aspects may give a new perspective 
on the universal. “Laws” and “concepts” – the forté of disciplined 
scholarly work, are all universals. Inductive and metaphorical 
abstraction from empirical individuality reaches out into the 
“unseen”, for it is never possible to have direct experience of “all 
swans …” or “the swan” or “the law of gravity” or “the process of 
natural selection”. The discipline of self-relativising is therefore 
something to be instilled into students.  
• Focused abstraction 
Focusing on one aspect outside the context of the normal view of its 
coherence, may help to construct another understanding of that 
aspect, which may also have its effects on the understanding of 
other aspects. Focusing, however, remains pretending – that the 
coherence among aspects can be ignored for the moment. 
However, the coherence has to come into focus at an early stage – 
not simply by way of synthesis in hindsight. No system is ever 
closed, and taking the openness of the system into account, may 
change the perception about, or understanding of the aspect 
focused on.  
• Simplifying abstraction  
Simplifying allows for modelling, and makes it possible to twist and 
turn the model, and also use the model as a norm for explanation in 
areas other than its origin. Models can also be metaphorised. 
Models are representations of structure – but simplified and 
therefore ignoring certain aspects or factors considered as 
irrelevant. Scientific laws are such structural coherences often found 
by way of modelling. Models are probably a complexity of 
universals. By shifting some elements in a model, one can obtain a 
different explanatory perspective. However, from Plato onwards 
these abstract simplifications were elevated into a normative 
position. Students therefore need to learn how to avoid 
oversimplification, and to avoid absolutising the model and its 
branched out metaphors, as if the final truth.  
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• Generalising abstraction  
Since Socrates this process of abstraction has been explicitly 
analysed in all its forms over centuries. It has different forms: 
(i) From mythology over Plato and the Renaissance to the modern 
Bedyayev, thinkers generalised from part to whole – the assumption 
being that the microcosmical part is a likeness of the macrocosmical 
whole. In present-day statistical analysis sampling is a conscious 
construction of the part to be like the whole (but how do we know it 
does look like the whole?); (ii) Induction, a well-known procedure, is 
to generalise from and identify with the help of shared 
characteristics in individuals. Next (iii) is idealising abstraction, which 
can employ the two others, moving upwards to ideal types. Since 
Plato, it is an attempt to cross the gap between “is” and “ought”, and 
between individual “case” and “law”. Generalising abstraction is the 
process which generate most stereotypes and prejudices, and 
students need a thorough introduction to this.  
A condensation18 of meaning and power is inherent in abstractive 
processes, which, as was said above with regard to technology, 
overshoots or undershoots, or sometimes hits the target intended. 
Condensation of meaning and power enables followers and critics to 
find further innovative possibilities in the basic creative idea: both 
constructive and destructive.  
4.4 Abstraction and responsibility 
The issue of responsibility can thus not be avoided. Abstraction is 
not a neutral process – it starts out from a perspectivised “reality” 
(containing previous abstractions), and is done by a complete 
person, whose interests are co-determined by religion, education, 
personal experiences, interests of all kind, handicaps, mental 
tendencies and intuitions skewed one way or the other.  
Proposition 10:  
The manipulation of “factuality” allowed for by abstraction does 
not absolve scholars from respecting the deeper layer of 
normativity, such as human dignity, stewardship towards the 
environment, mutual care, justice, etcetera.  
                                      
18 An Open University Coursebook about creativity says a creative product may be 
composed of well-known things, but in such a way that new possibilities can be 
disclosed in different situations.  
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Condensation has to be offset by coherence. Human beings cannot 
create anything out of nothing, and the imagination will therefore 
always have to depend on analogies and simplifications which have 
their sources “elsewhere”. For Einstein the “truly creative principle” 
in physics (and in fact in all sciences) “resides in mathematics” and 
not in “experience” (which includes laboratory experiences). There is 
a openness, a “fictitiousness”, on the side of principles, that allows 
for alternative explanations of the same phenomena. Einstein 
therefore believes that the concepts of physics cannot be derived 
from experience, but are the products of pure mathematical thinking, 
which somehow reflects the structure of the world.19
However, the condensation side of Einstein’s abstract procedures is 
of serious concern. On the one hand he saw the alternative 
possibilities in mathematics; on the other hand he put himself under 
the discipline of a view of physics and science which is very one-
sided. He believed in the idea of a unified science under the 
guidance of a deterministic causal view of the world, and this in the 
format of a deductive system. In order to find a unified science in a 
deductive format, he could only take his point of departure in 
mathematics. Secondly, not a mathematician himself, he had to 
search for an open mathematical system (that of Riemann), which 
could accommodate his intuitions. He therefore had to reduce 
certain physical features to geometric ones: time became a fourth 
dimension. He, however, did not investigate the basis of Riemann 
critically, or the reduction of the multiformity of time to a fourth 
dimension.  
                                      
19 But quite apart from the question of comparative merits, the fictitious character 
of the principles is made quite obvious by the fact that it is possible to exhibit 
two essentially different bases, each of which in its consequences leads to a 
larger measure of agreement with experience. This indicates that any attempt to 
logically derive the basic concepts and laws of mechanics from the ultimate data 
of experience is doomed to failure. If then it is the case that the axiomatic basis 
of theoretical physics cannot be an inference from experience, but must be free 
invention, do we have any hope that we shall find the correct way? Still more – 
does this correct approach exist at all, save in our imagination? … To this I 
answer with complete assurance, that in my opinion there is the correct path 
and moreover, that it is in our power to find it. Our experience … justifies us in 
feeling sure that in nature is actualised the ideal of mathematical simplicity. It is 
the author’s conviction that pure mathematical construction enables us to 
discover the concepts and the laws connecting them, which gives us the key to 
the understanding of the phenomena of nature (Einstein, 1960:82-83; cf. further 
Venter, 1999:169 ff.). 
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Even more questionable was Einstein’s causal approach, not only in 
terms of quantum mechanics (which could not be accommodated, 
apparently exactly because of the concept of time), but because he 
could not take account of moral responsibility.  
In the freedom of man in the philosophical sense I do not 
believe at all. Every human being acts not only under external 
compulsion, but also according to inner necessity. 
Schopenhauer’s statement ‘a human being can do what he 
wants but not want what he wants’, filled me lively since my 
youth, and was always a comfort to me in seeing and suffering 
the hardships of life, and an inexhaustible source of tolerance. 
This consciousness softens in a beneficent way the easily 
paralysing feeling of responsibility, and causes us not to take 
ourselves and the others too seriously. It leads to a conception 
of life which also allows humour in a rightful place 
(Einstein,1955:7). 
It has already been stated in this article that creativity means 
overcoming habitual rules. But how far may this go? For Einstein the 
laws of physics are the laws of biotic life, the psyche, artistic activity, 
and religious faith. This means that scientism is for him the final 
answer. He can keep nobody responsible (not even Hitler). Einstein 
himself would not be paralysed by the feeling of responsibility.  
The process of universalising abstraction, which is the mechanism 
used to construct a deductive, unified approach, has limits in itself. 
This becomes clear when one reads Russell and Whitehead’s 
“explanation” of the most fundamental axiom in their famous 
Principia mathematica: the “stroke function”. Although they do attach 
some verbal meaning to the function, they also state that it is in fact 
impossible to do so. Thus, since all the laws of logic and 
mathematics can be deduced from this function, it becomes pure 
abstract technicism: pure procedure. Given that we actually cannot 
know what the function means, it becomes impossible to really 
determine whether the claims made about it are in fact sustainable. 
Secondly, if the deductions are to be valid, they presuppose the 
laws of logic, which are only deduced much later down the line! (cf. 
Russel & Whitehead, 1970:xiii; xix). As Wittgenstein (1974:74) said: 
“What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (see 
Proposition 8). 
The denial of other forms of human knowledge, whether scholarly 
knowing in the humanities, streetwiseness, artistic intuition, or moral 
wisdom, therefore actually absolved Einstein from theorising with 
contextual responsibility. He – a Jew – scholarly “forgot” the history 
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of physics and its role in Hiroshima, and the history of chemistry and 
its role in Auschwitz within five years.  
5. In retrospect 
I therefore maintain that there are limiting conditions that have to 
remain upright: the care of being, whether human or otherwise, in all 
of different senses. Natural science, technique, technology – all 
have their rightful place. If human context and these limiting 
conditions are, however, not taken into consideration from the very 
beginning then on the one hand abstractive processes will remain 
within the innovative stream. On the other hand, “creative” 
processes will overstep their normative boundaries and condensed 
meaning and power will become explosive. 
I have tried to indicate that economy of scale in the university 
context, which includes minimalising academic staff and its support 
systems, combined with the maximum (how determined?) intake in 
student numbers, pushes the university, even in its reigning 
epistemology, ideologically in the direction of technicism, scientism, 
and economism (imposed by neo-pragmatist managerialism), which 
introduces stereotypical forms of innovation, and inhibits risk taking, 
although disciplined playfulness is needed for creative scholarship.  
Finally, I have tried to analyse the range of problems with their 
proportionate risks, as well as the basic forms of abstraction, in 
order to give some indication of how scholars are to support the 
development of a responsible spirit of renewal of knowledge in their 
students, without reinventing the wheel.  
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